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Response to Sarbeswar Sahoo and Eliza Kent
Nathaniel Roberts
Abstract: In this response to Sarbeswar Sahoo,
and Eliza Kent, I attempt to address some of the
questions, challenges and insights they have
put forth in their comments on To Be Cared For.
I focus, in particular, on the methodological
question of how I define the object of that and
what it leaves out, and how I justify my own
epistemological stance in relation to those I
study, whose views I sometimes challenge. I do
so by highlighting a basic distinction between
ethnographic studies which take religion itself
as an object of investigation, and an
anthropological study such as mine, in which
religion is approached as an aspect of social
reality. I then draw a distinction between two
ways of understanding “culture,” and the links
I see between them and the two contrasting
views of religious conversion described in the
book. I end by clarifying what I see as the
ethical imperatives of this sort of research and
its relation to the question of religious
tolerance.
I am very grateful to the Society for Hindu–
Christian Studies for the opportunity to
converse with Sarbeswar Sahoo, Eliza Kent,
Shana Sippy, and Amy Alloco at an SHCSsponsored panel for my book in Denver, 2018,
and to respond further to the first two in print
here. It is an honor, furthermore, to address
the broader community of scholars who read
and contribute to the Journal of Hindu–
Christian Studies. Their expertise is in precisely
the two religious traditions whose differences,
similarities, and interaction emerged as a
major point of interest in my own research,
though this was not what I originally set out to
study. My questions were always sociological in
focus and trained in particular on the crushing
odds slum dwellers face and how they attempt

to even them. This focus led me to religion and
in particular to the religious lives of women,
because religion was regarded as women’s
work in the slum’s gendered division of labor.
It is difficult to know how to address in a
single essay all the questions and challenges
my respondents have handed me and I have
therefore adopted an oblique approach that
begins with two features of To Be Cared For
that many readers coming to it from a religious
studies background have found noteworthy.
The first concerns my observation that, in
contrast to slum Christianity, the form of
Hinduism I encountered in Kashtappattinam
was discursively very thin—that tales of gods,
great yogis and bhaktas, moral narratives,
cosmological speculation, and so forth, were
notably absent from Hinduism as practiced
there (pp. 217–19). The other is my willingness,
highlighted by Shana Sippy in Denver, to
challenge and even “correct” the views of my
informants. The first is noteworthy because the
Hindu tradition overall is well known for its
discursive richness, and because most if not all
academic studies of Hinduism have focused, to
greater or lesser degrees, on this aspect. The
second, because it flies in the face of the
common practice in the field of religious
studies of treating informants’ testimony as
veridical, and perhaps also because it flouts the
stance of conceptual relativism that many
scholars, including many anthropologists, see
as ethically imperative in research contexts
involving a clear power imbalance between the
researcher and his or her subjects.
My explanation for both comes down to
the fact that although To Be Cared For has
much to say about religion its ultimate focus is
sociological. That is to say, its primary purpose
is to understand the concrete relations among
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persons and the objective structures—written
and unwritten rules, the conventions, the
distribution of wealth and power, and so on—
that shape them. These structures are
objective insofar as they exceed participants’
conscious or unconscious ideas about them.
Though social reality is mediated by
participants’ beliefs about it, it is not reducible
to those beliefs. Gaps between what people
believe and what is in fact the case are
inevitable, not only in the societies we study
but also our own. Put another way, social
reality is never transparent and necessarily
exceeds our understanding of it (Graeber
2015). The situation is very different when the
object of study is not society but religion. At
least in the case of lived religion (Orsi 2010),
the contents of that religion are whatever
participants take them to be—no more, and no
less. There is no scope in the study of lived
religion for the scholarly observer to secondguess or “correct” what practitioners tell them,
because the practitioner is the highest and
ultimate authority when it comes to their own
beliefs. 1
Some examples will help illustrate why I
think it is important to actively challenge and
not simply defer to native claims, at least when
it comes to claims about social reality, and also
why I do not extend this precept to matters of
religious faith. One of the surprising discoveries
of my research in the slums of
Kashtappattinam was the very positive image
the people living there had of foreigners, whom
they envisioned as intrinsically moral and
caring, in contrast to the majority of their
fellow countrymen, who they believed to be
uniquely immoral and selfish. That an
oppressed population would harbor negative
stereotypes of their oppressors is not
surprising, but due diligence required me
challenge their claim that Indians are uniquely
or universally uncaring, because I do not
believe it to be the case. But imagine a
foreigner turning up in an African-American
ghetto and trying to convince the people living
there that white people aren’t really as racist as
they imagine them to be. When I tried
something similar in Anbu Nagar, the people I
spoke to were politely dismissive. I simply had
no standing to make such an argument, in their
view, because I had not experienced the things
they had. This may seem like a predictable
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol32/iss1/4
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outcome, but if I hadn’t challenged them, I
would not have known this for a fact. And
though I make very clear in the pages of To Be
Cared For that I do not agree that caste people
are uniformly uncaring, or uniquely so, by the
end of my field research I had observed enough
to understand why my subjects would think so.
More perplexing to me was the firm
conviction among slum dwellers that people
outside India exemplify their own moral ideal
of loving kindness, or care. This was both
surprising, firstly, because it reversed the
supposedly universal human trait of
ethnocentrism. According to the theory of
ethnocentrism, all humans see their own
culture as the best, and envision a series of
concentric circles of identity such that the
more distant from the self/center the worse.
The people of Anbu Nagar, by contrast,
scrambled the conventional picture of ranked
concentric identities. In their view, the most
distant identity of all—those who share
nothing with the people but their bare
humanity—were regarded as natural allies,
whereas those with whom they shared so
much at cultural level, the majority of their
fellow Tamils and fellow Indians, were not
second best to themselves, but the worst
people of all! The other reason this surprised
me is that there was simply no basis for it.
Foreigners do not, as anyone reading this will
know, uphold the slum moral ideal of caring for
the poor and the weak.
As a foreigner myself, and someone who
had spent the majority of my life outside India,
in multiple countries, I had standing to speak
authoritatively on this matter. Yet my attempts
to convince them were consistently brushed
off. I could not dislodge their view, but I would
not have known this if I hadn’t tried! Only by
challenging them did I learn that this particular
belief was not only very deeply held, but deeply
held despite the fact that they had no actual
evidence for it. We often speak of beliefs—
religious or otherwise—as if they are all of a
piece, but beliefs differ greatly in how they are
held. Some beliefs are held deeply; others
lightly. Beliefs can be based on the evidence of
personal experience, but they can also
contradict it. And how a particular belief is held
is as important as its contents, at least for an
ethnographer who wants to understand the
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concrete social configuration within which
those beliefs are produced.
The point I am trying to make is that
challenging the ideas of our research subjects
plays an important methodological role, and I
do not think it takes anything away from the
people we write about to do so. Put another
way, respecting our subjects’ dignity does not
require us to treat them as infallible. Few
people see themselves as infallible and, outside
of a few very circumscribed domains of human
activity, on most matters people are more
interested in getting it right than insisting on
the correctness of whatever their current
understanding happens to be. The most
significant exception is when holding a
particular belief (or to be more precise,
professing to hold it) functions as a marker of
group identity, an affirmation of loyalty and
belonging. For example, during the Vietnam
War it was permissible in American public
discourse to debate whether getting into the
war had been a mistake or not, and also to
criticize the particular way American strategic
objectives were pursued. What was not up for
discussion, as Noam Chomsky (1977) has
argued, was the fundamental precept that
America’s motives for being in the region were
noble. To suggest that this might not be so—
that America was an amoral or even immoral
force in the world—was to render oneself an
outsider. In the language of the era, to voice
such thoughts was simply un-American.
It is generally only when a belief is linked to
being part of a team that challenges to it are
taken as an attack, and rightly so. For to
undermine such a belief is to undermine the
collective being of those who define
themselves in terms of it. It threatens the very
basis on which members are distinguished
from non-members, and for this reason
identity-defining beliefs are normally imbued
with an intensely moral character. To reject
such a belief is not merely to change one’s
mind, but to betray, and group members often
subject potential defectors to intense moral
pressure to prevent them from doing so.
Religious belief is widely regarded as a
paradigmatic example of an identity-defining
belief, or commitment. The history of
Christianity provides a ready-made example,
insofar as creedal statements have been
explicitly used in that tradition to define group
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2019

membership (Ruel 1982). But even traditions
that do not require formal declarations of faith
may react defensively when its beliefs are
questioned, as for example when its gods are
declared not to be gods at all but stone idols. 2
The opposition of many Hindus to religious
conversion, and the strong moral pressure
mobilized to prevent it, is certainly an example
of belief playing such a role. Religious belief is,
in this example, not merely about a person’s
commitment to God, but simultaneously to a
social identity. But what my research shows is
that commitment to a particular god does not
necessarily entail commitment to the social
identity commonly associated with that god.
Though the two commitments—which we
might distinguish as faith and partisanship—
are often linked, they need not be, and a
correct understanding of slum conversion is
not possible if we fail to keep the two
analytically distinct.
Simply put, the question of which god a
person worshipped in the slum was of no
consequence to group identity. Faith, defined
as a relationship of commitment between a
human being and a god, did not entail
commitment to any team or faction in the
world of the slum, for the simple reason that
“Christians” and “Hindus” did not comprise
two distinct social formations or communities
there. Even within a single household or family,
one normally found both Christians and
Hindus, and there was no expectation that
children should follow the religious practices of
their parents, or that spouses would worship
the same gods as one another (pp. 152–3).
There was therefore no attempt by slum
dwellers to pressure one another to conform
religiously. Slum dwellers argued frequently
about which gods were the best. The criteria
they assessed them on, however, were not
moral but their propensity to respond to the
needs of those who worshipped them, a topic
on which new evidence was actively sought
and hotly debted. In their morality, all gods
were assumed to be identical. Hindu gods were
not morally defective according to Christians,
but existentially so—for unlike the Christian
god they did not actually exist. Even Christian
pastors did not present their god as morally
distinct from Hindu gods, only more
responsive, because Hindu gods were “mere
stone idols” and therefore to help anyone, in
3
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reality. Hindus, for their part, acknowledged
the Christian god’s existence, but held him to
be a weak and overly demanding deity (p. 152).
Notably, neither side took offense at the
other’s negative assessment of their chosen
gods, misguided though they may be. A
person’s decisions about which god or gods to
worship—and therefore the phenomenon of
religious conversion—was not a morally
fraught in the slum, in short, because gods
were regarded as morally identical. And they
were regarded as morally identical, I argue,
because they were not forced to double as
emblems of social identity.
Space does not permit me to elaborate on
the relationship of faith that bound the
individual worshipper to their god of choice, or
how the notion of faith (vicuvācam) was
articulated within a constellation of related
concepts, such as belief (nampikai), knowledge
(aṟivu), perception (terital), understanding
(purital), and evidence (cāṭci) (Roberts 2012:
283). Nor can I explain how such relationships
might be voluntarily severed without moral
jeopardy, though I will note that neither
Christians nor Hindus believed worship was
something gods themselves demanded or
defined as obligatory for human beings. But I
hope it is clear that the non-obligatory
character of worship, like the non-moralization
of religious choice itself, follows from the social
organization of religious belief, i.e. decisions
about which god to worship not being linked to
social faction. This is a significant finding in the
Indian context, where religious conversion is
widely but falsely assumed to be socially
disruptive, and legally suppressed on that basis
(pp. 111–51). What I have shown, however, is
that the disruptions and social conflict
sometimes
associated
with
religious
conversion are an automatic outcome of
religious conversion as such, or to the act of
proselytism, or to religious differences as such,
or to conversion being a psychologically
destabilizing event—to cite just a few of the
many arguments that circulate in India and
elsewhere (pp. 111–115; Roberts 2012). They
are due to power-infused relations among
people, in which gods function as emblems of
communal identity, and in which the dominant
community is permitted to assert its will over
minorities under the guise of “wounded
sentiments” (pp. 261–2; Viswanath 2016).
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol32/iss1/4
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I began this response by stressing that,
although religion plays a prominent role in To
Be Cared For, its ultimate focus is sociological,
and that understanding slum religion assumed
significance because of the role it plays in my
subjects’ socially constituted existence. I
promised that the sociological character of my
study would help explain two features that
readers approaching To Be Cared For from the
perspective of Religious Studies have found
unusual: my willingness to challenge my
informant’s beliefs, and my finding that
Hinduism as practiced was discursively very
thin. The thinness of local Hinduism, as I have
described it, comes as a surprise to many
because the Hindu tradition as a whole is
renowned for its discursive richness, a richness
that has attracted the attention of scholars for
obvious reasons and is therefore heavily
represented in the literature. And indeed, had
my own research mandate been to contribute
to the study of Hinduism as such, rather than
being confined to the aspects of it that were
relevant to the women I had chosen to study, I
would have had much more to say.
In a slum tenement not far from Anbu
Nagar lived a nonagenarian by the name of
Loganathan, a kind-eyed man whose slight but
ever-present smile reminded me of the Zen
teacher Thich Nhat Hanh. He was known locally
as a medium (cāmiyāṭi) (p. 218), and for his
talent for inducing women to become
possessed in certain festivals (p. 180, fig 10).
Apart from these ritual functions, however,
Loganathan played no discernable role in slum
women’s lives, and no one I asked seemed to
know anything about him or care. But based on
the handful of interviews I conducted with him,
I can attest that he was a wellspring of
cosmological knowledge, who claimed,
furthermore, to know “hundreds and
hundreds” of songs about the gods, and
thousands of praises. He had learned from his
own father, also a cāmiyāṭi. Loganathan shared
his sadness that, though he had so much to
teach, no one was interested. He had not a
single student, and knew that when he died all
the knowledge he had accumulated would die
with him.
He was also keenly interested in
Christianity—which he understood not as a
rival sect but a powerful ritual system with
unique capacities that complemented his own.
4
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One of the most useful things about
Christianity, he told me, was the startling fact
that when the dead are buried with Christian
rites their spirits go away forever and never
return as ghosts to haunt the living. How did he
know this, I asked him, and was he sure? He
assured me that he knew all the local ghosts,
and had spoken with most of them, and not a
single one of them had been buried as a
Christian. He did not know how this had been
accomplished, but he hailed it as among the
most important benefits conferred on the slum
by local pastors, whom he seemed to regard as
professional colleagues. He was aware that
they did not return the favor, though he did not
begrudge their ignorance. In this and so many
other ways, Loganathan’s religious ideas were
consistent with what I have described as the
logic of slum religion (pp. 152–84)—the
underlying principles and assumption about
what constitutes religion as such, for both
Christians and Hindus alike.
Loganathan was already an elderly man in
2003–4, and he is almost certainly no more.
The last of his lineage, his knowledge will die
with him, though I am certain there are others
like him, somewhere, just waiting for some
young scholar to take an interest in what they
have to teach. I wish I had been able to delve
deeper into his world than I did, but because
the focus of my research was sociological, he
appears only fleetingly in the story I tell (pp.
180, 218). His treasure trove of knowledge
played no role at all, because the women on
whom my study centers were indifferent to it.
But the fact that he existed at all and was

ignored despite possessing such a wealth of
knowledge, supports one major claim in my
book. Namely, that it is not the discursive
richness of Christianity that distinguishes it
from Hinduism, ultimately, but its novel
institutional form.
The key innovation of slum Christianity was
that it had, quite unintentionally I suspect,
provided slum women with a public platform of
a kind they had never previously possessed
from which to articulate claims against
husbands and others who had failed to care for
them. The duty to care was attested equally by
Hindus and Christians, who alike hailed it as the
very essence of human morality, not linked to
any religion in particular, but sacred
nonetheless. Christianity provided women with
a new language though which speak about
care, but they understood it to be a universal
human value, not a specifically Christian one.
Slum women, in other words, did not need
Christianity to teach them about care. What
they lacked was not the words but the
institutional means to make their grievances a
matter of public knowledge and therefore
collective responsibility. The relationship
between husband and wife constituted a
dangerous moral fault line (p. 81) within the
slum community—one of two I detail in the
book—in which the duty to care was honored
as often as not in the breach. The mistreatment
of women continued, however, because the
sacred moral precept it violated remained a
phantasm so long as women lacked the
institutional means to call for help.
There is a lesson here, I am sure.

Notes

I stress that the principle of native
authority applies only to the study of lived
religion, by which I mean religion as it is
experience and understood in the lives of
practitioners. The principle does not hold for
religion as expressed in a textual corpus
stretching over many centuries or millennia.
Conceptualized this way, religion is an
objective reality that, like society, is not
reducible to participants’ ideas about it. A
second qualification concerns the distinction
between beliefs and practices. In contrast to
Robert Orsi and other scholars of lived
religion, I hold that the principle of native
authority applies stricto sensu only to belief,
1
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not practices. For in contrast to beliefs,
practices are only partially defined by
participants’ ideas about them, a point pithily
expressed by Michel Foucault’s observation
that “people know what they do; they
frequently know why they do what they do;
but what they don’t [necessarily] know is
what what they do does” (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1982: 187).
2 Hinduism famously emphasizes correct
practice (orthopraxy) over correct belief
(orthodoxy), and in this way differs from
creedal traditions like Christianity and Islam.
But the absence of a single orthodoxy in the
Hindu tradition does not imply and absence
of belief of the kind anthropologists are
concerned with, which includes the full range
of implicit codes and assumptions through
which human beings comprehend their
world. In this sense belief does not stand in
contrast to religious practice but is intrinsic
to it. Religious practices necessarily entail
beliefs of some sort, even if unformulated, for
example the belief that a particular ritual
ought to be performed or that some benefit
(spiritual or otherwise) will come of it.
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